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Political developments in Latin America (LA) have repeatedly fuelled a rich, 
ongoing, and contentious academic debate about democracy and its deficits. 
LA is a region characterised by presidential democracies, a political system 
with arguably serious structural shortcomings. Brazil and Venezuela, both 
of which are currently undergoing severe political crises, are illustrative of 
both the perils of presidentialism and the institutional mechanisms that 
have enabled LA presidential democracies to survive, albeit with deficits.
 • Latin America is home to various political models of presidential democracy, in-
cluding several variants of majoritarian presidentialism and presidential domi-
nance as well as coalition presidentialism and other ad hoc solutions for minority 
governments.  
 • Inter-institutional deadlocks due to presidents’ lack of adequate support in the re-
spective Congress are perceived as a major shortcoming and a risk for presidential 
democracies.  
 • “Coalition presidentialism,” as practiced in Brazil, has been an innovative LA solu-
tion for overcoming political deadlocks. However, the converse argument implies 
that without a coalition there might be no surviving president.  
 • While the Brazilian Congress is trying to remove President Rousseff by means 
of impeachment, Venezuelan president Maduro is orchestrating a constitutional 
coup to disempower Congress. In both cases the presidents face an adverse major-
ity in Congress, but the solution to the deadlock situation is different for each case.
 • Political stalemates between a congress and a president can be resolved by different 
means. On the one hand, presidents can try to sidestep and disempower the congress. 
On the other, minority presidents have sometimes been forced to resign, or removed 
by impeachment and other institutional equivalents to a “vote of non-confidence.”
Policy Implications
If presidents are unable to control their parties or coalitions, their removal may 
become a real possibility, despite fixed presidential terms. Some scholars call for 
constitutional reforms to allow for earlier elections. We argue that impeachment 
should be replaced by a vote of non-confidence (by a two-thirds majority). Then 
the political debate would be framed less in normative terms (questioning the 
moral integrity of the incumbent president) and more in political-programmatic 
and partisan-related terms.
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Latin America as a Role Model in the  
Third Wave of Democratisation
In 1990 Juan Linz published an influential article in the Journal of Democracy 
 entitled “the Perils of Presidentialism” in which he did not make many favourable 
prognoses for the recently established democratic, and presidential, regimes of the 
region. But the political developments of the following decades did not corroborate 
his sceptical view. In its latest edition of 2016, the Bertelsmann transformation In-
dex (BtI) classified 17 out of 19 Latin American political systems as democracies. 
Certainly, a few of them are regarded as consolidating democracies, while most clas-
sify as defective democracies. since the beginning of 2016, LA has witnessed two ma-
jor political crises, in Venezuela and Brazil, which despite being extreme are predict-
able crises within presidential regimes, as Linz and other classical authors argued in 
the early years of Latin America’s democratisation. In these two cases the presidents 
face an adverse majority in Congress: in Brazil, Congress is using the constitutional 
mechanism of impeachment to oust President Rousseff, while in Venezuela Pres-
ident Maduro is manipulating the rules of the decision-making process to disem-
power a confrontational Congress dominated by his political opponents. Both the 
crises’ constellations and the instruments being used to solve the impasse situations 
are not new in the region. the impeachment resembles previous presidential crises 
during the third wave in which presidents have had to leave power before finishing 
their constitutionally fixed mandates under the pressure of unfavourable majorities 
in congress and often also protests in the streets. Where the president has left power, 
though, democracy has persisted. the Venezuelan case, in contrast, more closely re-
sembles the auto-golpe solutions (such as that in Peru in 1992), which saw congress 
unilaterally closed by the executive and the democratic regime break down. Latin 
American presidentialism is like a chameleon: it changes its colours in response to its 
political environment. But it is still the same political animal. While the institutional 
configuration may be prone to producing political stalemates, political actors are re-
sponsible for creating and resolving these stalemates. Moreover, they do not act in 
a socio-economic vacuum. In Brazil and Venezuela it was the economic downturns 
that fuelled the loss of support for the presidents among citizens.
The Latin American Debate about (Presidential) Democracy 
Latin American political developments have repeatedly fuelled a rich, ongoing, 
and contentious academic debate about democracy and its deficits. the region’s 
scholarly literature has paid particular attention to the functioning of democratic 
institutions (with a special focus on presidentialism). the political and aca demic 
self-reflection on how these institutions can be improved has a long tradition. 
since the 1970s Latin America has also contributed significantly to general theory 
building in comparative politics. the academic work of renowned scholars such as 
 Guillermo O’Donnell has inspired the study of modern authoritarian regimes us-
ing the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism. the region was also central in a 
large comparative project on the breakdown of democracies (coordinated by Juan 
Linz and Alfred stepan, 1978). there can be no breakdown of democracy without 
democracy, which demonstrates that Latin America has a longer democratic tradi-
   3    GIGA FOCus | LAtIn AMeRICA | nO. 1 | MAy 2016 
tion than other world regions. Latin America was also prominent in the literature 
on democratic transitions. together with Portugal, spain, and Greece, Latin Ameri-
can countries embarked on the third wave of democratisation in the 1970s. In fact, 
the work Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, 
Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead), published in 1986, includes sections 
on southern europe and on Latin America. Juan Linz stimulated a broad intellec-
tual debate about the virtues of parliamentarism and the perils of presidentialism 
(including models of semi-presidentialism). In Brazil in 1993 there was even a ref-
erendum on the form of government (presidential versus parliamentarian). Later, 
Guillermo O’Donnell critically analysed the “brown areas of democracy” and the 
deficits of accountability, introducing the concept of “delegative democracy.” Other 
LA scholars coined innovative analytical concepts such as “hyperpresidentialism” 
or “coalition presidentialism.” today, these concepts belong to the academic main-
stream and have enriched the analytical toolbox for the study of political institu-
tions in developing countries beyond the region. More recently, the proponents of a 
“new constitutionalism” in Latin America have promised a more participatory and 
socially inclusive democracy.
Latin America’s broad and ongoing academic debate about democratic deficits 
is facilitated by the existence of a great number of independent universities, re-
search institutes and think tanks. Institutions matter, and the self-reflection of the 
region’s scholars on how to improve their performance has a long tradition. In 2001, 
for instance, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) published a study en-
titled Democracies in Development, with the participation of many LA distinguished 
scholars, that analysed the effects of institutions on presidential demo cracies and 
assessed efforts to improve governance (a second revised edition was published in 
2007). Another book published by the IDB in 2006, entitled Politics of Policies, con-
sists of comparative analyses of institutions and political practices in Latin American 
presidential systems, with the objective of explaining why reforms endure in some 
countries and why some countries can easily change policies that are not working 
well. the cases of Brazil and Venezuela are currently being widely discussed within 
LA academia (and by LA specialists abroad), leading once more to the revision of for-
mer explanations, the introduction of new concepts, and pro posals for institutional 
change. Perez-Linan’s contribution on the importance of building a congressional 
shield against impeachment and Marsteintredet’s arguments on the flexibilisation of 
the presidential term have recently been revisited, as there has been renewed interest 
in some of the classical texts on presidential democracy.
The Perils of Presidentialism
In his renowned article, Juan Linz began with the observation that most of the stable 
democracies of europe and the Commonwealth at that time were parliamentary re-
gimes, while presidential regimes were either authoritarian or unstable. He argued 
that the instability of presidential regimes was connected to its essential features 
– that is, the principle of dual legitimacy, according to which both the president 
and the legislature equally derive their power from the vote of the people, and the 
fixed mandates for both elected institutions. the fixed term introduced rigidities to 
the system that made crisis and conflict resolution more difficult, in contrast with 
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the flexible solutions available to parliamentary regimes, including the dissolution 
of parliament, the vote of confidence, and the possibility of calling new elections. 
the direct election of the executive and legislative powers gave both president and 
congress direct, and dual, democratic legitimacy, thus inducing inter-institutional 
struggles and making it unclear which would prevail in the event of a conflict be-
tween the two. Linz further argued that the absence of majorities in congress, which 
increased the likelihood of deadlock, was a predictable consequence of these essen-
tial features of presidentialism. 
However, Latin American presidential democracies survived since the third 
wave of transition initiated in the region in 1978, and the problems that Linz at-
tributed to presidentialism turned out to be much less pervasive than previously 
thought. As early as the first part of the 1990s, academics pointed out that the po-
tential risks that Linz had attributed to presidentialism actually concerned certain 
institutional constellations, especially the “difficult combination” of presidential-
ism with a multiparty system, where presidents might have difficulty gathering 
legis lative support for their agendas. In such situations, whether presidents are able 
to overcome the shortage of legislative support or not is conditioned by institutional 
factors, such as the level of fragmentation of the party system or the constitutional 
authority of the executive, but it also depends heavily on their own strategic calcu-
lus. Presidents count on many constitutional powers to influence the legislative pro-
cess (the so-called agenda-setting powers, including those to legislate unilaterally 
through decrees with the force of laws), but they use those powers differently. We 
have witnessed presidents who have resorted to them to govern alone, refraining 
from engaging in building majorities in congress and adopting imperial strategies 
that bypass the congress and the political parties sitting in it. And there have been 
presidents who have used unilateral resources in conjunction with a high degree of 
integration between the legislative and executive branches, mainly but not exclu-
sively through the formation of cabinet coalitions. 
Coalition Presidentialism and Presidential Breakdowns 
In practice, Latin American presidentialism has been coping with its intrinsic perils 
by innovating both politically and institutionally. First, Latin America has shown 
that stable multiparty coalitions can be built in presidential regimes, even if the 
country has a weakly institutionalised party system. “Coalition presidentialism” has 
therefore been a specific strategic response to the systemic constraints. under this 
scheme, the directly elected president serves as a coalitional formateur and uses 
his/her appointment prerogatives to recruit ministers from other parties in order 
to foster the emergence of a legislative cartel that could support her/his proposals 
in congress. successful cases of coalition presidentialism have occurred across the 
Latin American political landscape, from Brazil to Chile to uruguay, and a flourish-
ing literature has shown that coalitions have not necessarily been short-lived and 
ad hoc under presidential rule but have, rather, resembled those in parliamentary 
democracies. In Brazil, it has become routine for presidents to preside over succes-
sive government coalitions within their mandates to adjust their support in Con-
gress. Alongside the distribution of cabinet posts, presidents have also used other 
mechanisms to solve conflicts among coalition members and maintain control of 
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the legislative process, such as their agenda-setting powers and pork-barrelling. 
the combination of all these features constitutes a model of government that de-
parts significantly from the pure presidentialism found in the united states, which 
is unique and not representative of the whole group of presidential democracies. 
this variant of Latin American presidentialism therefore demonstrates that co-
alitions are possible in presidential democracies, minority presidents are not neces-
sarily weak, and a logic of confrontation does not always prevail in the inter-branch 
relations of presidential systems. However, coalition presidentialism presupposes 
a limited degree of political polarisation, which makes possible the cooperation be-
tween political parties across a broad ideological spectrum; a president who plays 
by the rules and recognises the limits of her/his status as a minority president; and 
a willingness to engage in power-sharing. Minority presidents may be tempted to 
use their wide emergency and agenda-setting powers to legislate alone, but this can 
get them into trouble.
Insufficient party support in congress can become a problem for presidents, 
particularly those facing other challenges (such as a tough economic situation, scan-
dals, popular discontent, and public mobilisation) and exhibiting weak leadership. 
Due to the electoral character of the office, the president is central to the political 
system, so a perceived failure to fix the country’s and the government’s problems 
directly affects presidential popularity, diminishing the propensity to cooperate of 
parties in congress and, in the case of government coalitions, of coalition partners. 
Last year President Otto Perez Molina from Guatemala, who faced serious ac-
cusations of corruption, resigned as a result of pressure from Congress and street 
protests; this year President Dilma Rousseff is facing the threat of impeachment. the 
fact is that, despite the rigidity of mandates under presidentialism, since the 1980s 
many presidents have been challenged and 17 presidents have actually been forced 
to make an extraordinary exit from power before the end of the constitutionally fixed 
term. these presidential interruptions or presidential breakdowns have not led to a 
rupture of the democratic order, as the original argument on the perils of presiden-
tialism claimed, despite most certainly being the outcome of very conflictive political 
situations. thus, the inter-institutional conflicts have led to a premature change in the 
presidency, an arguably innovative institutional feature of presidentialism in  Latin 
America. Very often, presidents have resigned while facing the pressure, but they have 
also been directly dismissed by congress. these congressional solutions often bear a 
resemblance to the flexible solutions that parliamentary regimes implement to cope 
with crisis (namely, early elections, votes of no confidence, and congressional elec-
tions of the presidential successor). even impeachment, which requires a special two-
thirds majority in the two chambers and is the exceptional conflict-resolution mecha-
nism available in presidential constitutions, can resemble a vote of no confidence, as 
in the case of President Fernando Lugo’s ousting from power in Paraguay. 
On the bright side of the equation, the political and institutional innovations of 
Latin American presidentialism have provided mechanisms for dealing with inter-
institutional conflicts and have avoided, with different intensities according to the 
case, the risks of democratic breakdown. On the shady side, the building and main-
tenance of congressional coalitions has proved to be demanding for presidents as 
well as for the political regime, and has not been exempt from clientelist and cor-
rupt practices. the “fluid” use of certain constitutional mechanisms to dismiss the 
president has also proved disruptive in contexts of political polarisation.  
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Coalition Presidentialism in Crisis:  
President Dilma Faces Impeachment  
After more than 40 hours of speeches, late in the evening of sunday, 17 April, Bra-
zil’s Chamber of Deputies voted on the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, 
with 367 of the 513 deputies backing the move. this was a comfortable majority 
beyond the two-thirds majority of 342 needed to advance the case to the upper 
house. Outside Congress, pro-impeachment protesters, dressed in green and yellow 
and draped in the national flag, celebrated. A fence separated them from the Dilma 
defenders, clothed in red. the deputies had 30 seconds each to justify their vote. 
Pro-Dilma voters invariably referred to the impeachment as an unjustified golpe 
against the president. Pro-impeachment deputies voted based on an eclectic bunch 
of reasons far beyond the actual violation of the norm that caused the impeachment 
move – that is, the president’s manipulation of accounts, last year, to make the fis-
cal deficit look smaller than it actually was. 
the high number of votes in favour of the impeachment are not easy to un-
derstand without acknowledging the context. President Rousseff is suffering from 
extremely low popularity as a result of economic and political factors: the country 
is facing a serious recession, while inflation and the unemployment rate are both at 
approximately 10 per cent. the exposure of the Petrobras corruption affair, which 
involves the president’s Workers’ Party (Pt), as well as its coalition partners and 
many others, has infuriated the public and motivated protests. even though there is 
still no evidence that Rousseff was directly involved, many people believe she must 
have known what was going on. Due to these events, latent rivalries among coali-
tion members have become apparent. As a matter of fact, the impeachment moved 
forward when relations between the Pt and the PMDB, the major coalition partner 
that controls the vice presidency and the presidency of the two congressional cham-
bers, fell apart. As sergio Abranches, who once coined the concept of “coalition 
presidentialism,” has put it, the impeachment is not a judicial process, but a politi-
cal process within the procedural framework established by the constitution. While 
the interpretation of the actual causes of an impeachment will always invite legal 
controversy, the gist of the matter is that a president without a partisan shield in 
congress has little chance of surviving an impeachment. We have seen legislatures 
failing to impeach the guilty, and presidents against whom no evidence could be 
identified being ousted.
All Brazilian presidents since the transition have been exposed to the threat 
of impeachment, but only one attempt, 24 years ago, has succeeded – against Fer-
nando Collor de Melo, the first popularly elected president in Brazil after 21 years of 
military rule. Collor’s attempt to implement a radical economic agenda to combat 
inflation resulted in recession, unemployment, and popular dissatisfaction. He was 
a president without the backing of a significant party of his own, who governed with 
an imperial and confrontational style, and with little congressional support from 
other parties. Dilma Rousseff has the backing of her party (which is an important 
but nevertheless minority party within a highly fragmented Congress), but she no 
longer has a coalition behind her. the Brazilian senate is currently in charge of 
assessing the merits of her impeachment. Her chances of survival are slim, if any.
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The Autocratic Face of Presidential Democracy:  
Back to the 1990s?
While coalition presidentialism renovated Latin American presidential democracy, 
giving it a consensual twist, there is also an autocratic tradition within the region 
that has never become extinct. By chance, the daughter of former Peruvian president 
 Alberto Fujimori is currently one of  the  contenders in the run-off ballot to become the 
next president of Peru. Fujimori (together with Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de 
Melo) provided inspiration for Guillermo O’Donnell’s famous delegative democracy 
argument of the early 1990s. Delegative democracies empower an individual to be the 
embodiment and interpreter of the highest interests of the nation for a specific amount 
of time, in isolation from political institutions and organised interests. In these re-
gimes, the weighty legacy of past authoritarian tendencies combined with a context of 
deep social and economic crisis results in the exalted status of the presidency and weak 
and heavily manipulated legislative and judicial branches. Carlos nino’s “hyperpresi-
dentialism” is another term coined during those years. It emphasises the superiority of 
the executive, which is enshrined in the constitution, and the excessive use of unilat-
eral mechanisms in the adoption of decisions. All three presidents were similar in this 
regard, but it was Fujimori who mounted an auto-golpe in response to congressional 
resistance to approving his neo-liberal plan of reforms. through a decree he dissolved 
Congress, gave the executive all legislative powers, and suspended much of the consti-
tution. new elections were called and a new constitution enacted, according to which 
Congress became unicameral and largely dominated by Fujimori’s supporters.
unlike Fujimori, President Menem enjoyed the support of his party, Peronism, 
which held favourable majorities in the two chambers of Congress over two presi-
dential terms. Menem demonstrated that he was a high-risk politician, ready to 
act on the margins of the constitution by using decretismo or packing the Supreme 
Court. But his parallel ability to work with his party and his party’s allies at the con-
gressional level was key to the success of an ambitious policy programme and the 
persistence of his leadership over a prolonged period of time. 
Presidents prone to unilateral excursions enjoying strong political backing have 
populated the regional landscape – for instance, as part of the pink tide during the 
first decade of this century. Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and evo Morales have also 
exemplified a delegative and hyperpresidential style of government, notwithstand-
ing their participatory discourses. their constitutions, embraced in the wave of ”new 
constitutionalism,” are very much in line with old school Latin American presidential-
ism in this regard. Latin American political institutions and constitutions are not at 
all static, but some elements have proved to be more resilient than others. since the 
beginning of the current democratic period in 1978, 16 new constitutions have been 
promulgated (mostly in the 1980s and 1990s). Moreover, a total of 275 constitutional 
amendments were made between 2000 and 2015, a period during which only three 
new constitutions came into force. While LA constitutions have become more inclu-
sive and have embraced more social and participatory rights, some authors, such as 
Roberto Gargarella, argue that the “engine room of the constitution” has not changed 
much. the engine room consists of the power-granting provisions of the constitution 
that determine the relative authority of political institutions and actors. It is interest-
ing that although presidential agenda-setting power has very often been increased, in 
many cases the power of congress and the judi ciary has been expanded as well. the 
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effects of these contradictory reforms depend to a great extent on the political majori-
ties. A president with a large majority can use his/her power to neutralise congress 
and the judiciary. A minority president may become beleaguered by an oppositional 
majority. this is a real possibility because through electoral reforms Latin American 
party systems have become more inclusive, and fragmented. Moreover, the now con-
stitutionally empowered judi ciary is another actor with potential veto power.
Venezuela: The Authoritarian Face of Presidentialism
After the government of Venezuelan president Maduro was defeated in the legisla-
tive elections in December 2015, the governmental majority in the outgoing Congress 
enhanced the partisan control of the Supreme Court and appointed 13 new judges 
by blatantly violating the constitution. the supreme Court has since proved to be a 
tremendous functional instrument for serving the executive and disempower ing the 
opposing Congress. First, the court called into question the status of three congres-
sional representatives who would have given the opposition a two-thirds majority in 
Congress (the necessary majority to pass constitutional amendments or to convene a 
constitutional assembly). second, it reinterpreted the constitution to limit Congress’s 
oversight and control powers, and it invalidated legislation (such as an amnesty law 
for convicts seen as political prisoners by the opposition) with political-ideological 
arguments. third, it corroborated the president’s power to legislate by decree, not-
withstanding Congress’s refusal to prolong the delegation of powers to the president. 
We interpret this behaviour as a constitutional coup engineered by the presi-
dent in cooperation with the supreme Court.  Javier Corrales coined the concept of 
“autocratic legalism”, a ruling strategy that has a long tradition in Latin America. 
the dictum “for my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law” has been attrib-
uted to former Brazilian president Getulio Vargas. the tendency to use the law in 
a partisan and  biased way against political adversaries has always remained alive. 
Recently, the tendency of politically submissive supreme courts to modify or re-
interpret the constitution has re-emerged in nicaragua and Honduras, where the 
Supreme Court in each case has invalidated constitutional stone clauses that pro-
hibited presidential re-election. In both cases the court rulings favoured the incum-
bent presidents. the case of Daniel Ortega of nicaragua exemplifies the traditions 
of personalism and caudillismo. He first became a revolutionary leader to topple a 
personalistic authoritarian dictatorship, then evolved from an autocratic revolu-
tionary to an actor playing by the rules of the democratic game, only to end up as a 
personalistic ruler in a democracy with strong authoritarian traits.  
With regard to Venezuela, Maduro did not really change the political logic of 
the Bolivarian regime. During the presidency of Hugo Chávez and at the beginning 
of the Maduro presidency, the government party controlled the executive, the leg-
islature, and the judiciary. therefore, there were no conflicts between the different 
state powers. While autocratic tendencies were evident during the Chávez presi-
dency, they could still be interpreted as being within the domain of a “delegative de-
mocracy” with a strong plebiscitary component. Maduro then crossed the line in the 
direction of authoritarianism. this explains why, for the moment, he is prevailing 
in the conflict and standoff with Congress. under democratic conditions, Congress 
is generally the institution that holds the strongest position in the event of conflict.
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It’s the Economy, Stupid    
As Bill Clinton’s campaign slogan against incumbent George Bush during a  period of 
economic recession proclaimed, it is the economy that explains – at least in part – 
why two incumbent Latin American presidents are in trouble. Political crises do not 
evolve in a socio-economic vacuum. In Brazil and Venezuela the economic downturn 
has fuelled the presidents’ loss of support among the citizens. Although the governing 
Pt in Brazil is deeply enmeshed in the corruption morass, the same is true for some 
of the principal adversaries of President Rousseff in the PMDB, until recently the 
main partner of her coalition. But it is in the context of an economic slump and social 
polarisation about distributional issues that a coalition to impeach the president has 
been cemented. However, while the impeachment may bring about a temporary solu-
tion to the political stalemate, the IMF forecast of negative growth of -3.8 per cent 
in Brazil for the current year and zero growth for next year means there is no easy 
way out of either the political or the economic crisis. Moreover, politics is now much 
more polarised and adversarial than during the past 20 years. In Venezuela, the eco-
nomic crisis is even worse, with the economy shrinking by 8 per cent and an inflation 
rate of up to 500 per cent. By ignoring the verdict of the electorate in December and 
by subsequently disempowering Congress, the government has clearly crossed the 
line between a defective democracy and an authoritarian regime. It is quite difficult 
to predict how the political stalemate, the partisan polarisation, and the economic 
crisis in Venezuela can be overcome. Perhaps this will necessitate external pressure 
and support. In the context of Latin America’s economic slowdown, it appears that 
the period of fine-weather demo cracy may be coming to an end and that some of the 
“perils” and less pleasant traits of presidential democracy may resurge.   
For a More Sincere Solution to Gridlock  
Presidentialism is here to stay. the probability of a blanket change to parliamentary 
democracy is close to zero; worldwide, the preferred type of democracy, (whether 
presidential or parliamentary), is quite entrenched. therefore, the structural chal-
lenges of presidential democracy will also not disappear. there is always the risk of 
political gridlock when the president has no majority in parliament. two extreme 
solutions have frequently emerged in Latin America when a political stalemate has 
emerged: either the president has prevailed, by bypassing or even dissolving con-
gress, or the congress has carried the day by unseating the president. Both ways out 
of crisis result in a short-term solution to the stalemate, but in both cases there is 
a risk of future costs for democracy. We believe that the risks are higher in the first 
case, because a presidential triumph may lead to an authoritarian variant, the un-
limited concentration of power in the hands of the head of the executive. Meanwhile, 
a triumph on the part of the congressional majority may increase political polarisa-
tion, because the presidential party will invariably argue that congress is defrauding 
those who voted for the president or, in other words, is reversing the result of the 
presidential elections.  
In part, political polarisation is connected to the fact that impeachment con-
cerns the president’s violation of norms or his/her misconduct in office. In reality, 
though, it is the size of the presidential majority that determines his/her fate. this 
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was clearly the case in Paraguay against President Lugo, and it is now the case in 
Brazil with President Rousseff, where the causes of the impeachment have gener-
ated enormous controversy. It would probably be more honest if LA constitutions 
substituted impeachments with votes of non-confidence with special majorities. 
the political debate would then be framed less in normative terms (questioning the 
moral integrity of the incumbent president) and more in political-programmatic 
and power-related terms, which often constitute the background to impeachments. 
Admitting such a semi-presidential solution into the constitution would better re-
flect what is going on in practice. But if a presidential regime is tilting towards au-
thoritarianism (as in Venezuela), the institutional design loses significance as such. 
In such a case, the international community should consider undertaking action. 
the intrinsic risks of presidentialism as well as the Latin American political and 
institutional innovations to cope with them are relevant for policymakers and scholars 
beyond this region. After all, presidential and semi-presidential regimes have extend-
ed to all other world regions with the third wave of democratisation. When democracy 
becomes the only game in town, situations of gridlock are very likely in presidential 
regimes. the extreme solutions a la latina have proved to be costly but still better 
than the return to authoritarian rule that was frequently the case in the past. 
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